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Key Exchange in IPsec Revisited: Formal Analysis of IKEv1 and IKEv2

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Computer Security – ESORICS 2011 (ESORICS 2011)
Key Exchange in IPsec Revisited: Formal Analysis of IKEv1 and IKEv2
  • Cas Cremers18 

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6879))

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  • European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
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  • 62 Citations

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Abstract

The IPsec standard aims to provide application-transparent end-to-end security for the Internet Protocol. The security properties of IPsec critically depend on the underlying key exchange protocols, known as IKE (Internet Key Exchange).

We provide the most extensive formal analysis so far of the current IKE versions, IKEv1 and IKEv2. We combine recently introduced formal analysis methods for security protocols with massive parallelization, allowing the scope of our analysis to go far beyond previous formal analysis. While we do not find any significant weaknesses on the secrecy of the session keys established by IKE, we find several previously unreported weaknesses on the authentication properties of IKE.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. ETH Zurich, Switzerland

    Cas Cremers

Authors
  1. Cas Cremers
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MSIS Department and CIMIC, Rutgers University, Washington Park 1, 07102, Newark, NJ, USA

    Vijay Atluri

  2. K.U. Leuven ESAT-COSIC, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, 3001, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium

    Claudia Diaz

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Cremers, C. (2011). Key Exchange in IPsec Revisited: Formal Analysis of IKEv1 and IKEv2. In: Atluri, V., Diaz, C. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2011. ESORICS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6879. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23822-2_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23822-2_18

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Keywords

  • Security protocols
  • IPsec
  • IKE
  • IKEv1
  • IKEv2
  • Formal analysis
  • protocol interaction
  • multi-protocol attacks

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